Identity Management Framework

To address the growing problem of identity theft and fraud, the Department is developing a draft identity management framework (IMF). The IMF will provide the basis for a robust, systematic, consistent and integrated approach to capturing and authenticating a person's identity when engaging with the Department. The IMF complements and supports other domestic identity management initiatives such as the State Services Commission EOI Standard and the eAuthentication strategy.[19]

Determining and verifying identity consistent with the EOI Standard would assist in raising the level of identity verification of non-citizens to the same standard as that expected of New Zealand citizens. This is particularly crucial when a non-citizen subsequently seeks New Zealand citizenship.

One proposed element of the IMF is the collection, storage and use of biometric information to link an identity to a person, and to ensure that this linkage remains in future interactions. The 1987 Act does not enable the Department to electronically scan, store, and use biometric information.

International Comparison

Biometric identity information is increasingly being used in comparable immigration systems and is regarded as essential to a modern immigration system. The United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and Canada all have provisions for the collection, storage and use of biometric identification of non-citizens arriving into or departing from those countries, or to establish or authenticate the identity of non-citizens at various stages of immigration processing. In the US this includes taking photographs and fingerprints of arriving temporary entrants at the border. The UK has trialled the use of fingerprints for applicants for British visas from a dozen countries associated with high numbers of suspect claims. The two-year trial saw over 1,400 people who had either previously been rejected as unfounded asylum claimants, or who had an adverse immigration history, being prevented from travelling to the UK. These people would previously have been unlikely to be detected.

This review presents an opportunity to provide for the use of technological developments to check and confirm identity both at the border and in other interactions with the Department.

Benefits of biometric information collection

The systematic use of biometric information within an immigration identity management framework would:

1. improve the integrity of the immigration system in terms of:
2. identity confirmation in immigration decision-making and confirmation of a non-citizen's identity if they seek New Zealand citizenship
3. providing greater assurance that identity fraud and persons posing risks to New Zealand will be detected
4. allow for processing immigration applications more quickly and effectively
5. facilitate processing of arrivals at the border, particularly of those deemed "low risk" travellers and New Zealand citizens, and
6. take advantage of technology to automate the current face-to-passport check that is a standard aspect of current border processing.

Safeguards to ensure that privacy considerations for biometric information are upheld and maintained are contained in the Privacy Act. They include requiring advice to be given to an individual that biometric information is being collected, and about the intended use and storage of the information. The Privacy Act also requires that there be processes by which an individual can access, review, or challenge the biometric information. The Department is required to comply with all the information privacy principles of the Privacy Act.

As additional safeguards, the Bill would set out the specific types of biometric information that may be required. The biometric information types proposed in the Bill are those that have United Nations ICAO developed standards (photograph/facial, iris, and fingerprint). It would not be responsible to go further than these forms at this time. However, biometric technology is developing rapidly and new technologies may lead to a desire to collect different biometric information. Future legislative amendments would be required to allow this.

Limitations of biometric information

Biometric identity information may generate false connections. People may enrol into the system on a fraudulent identity and if the person who actually owns that identity seeks to enrol, it would appear in the first instance to be a potentially fraudulent multiple entry. These circumstances mean it is vital that the Department always seeks to use documentary evidence to support initial enrolments and to consider that a potentially fraudulent multiple enrolment may be the result of previous fraud.

False matches will also require additional processing by immigration staff. However, the use of this system is likely to allow the Department to focus such additional verification work on potential risks rather than spread verification resource across all applicants and arrivals. Processing people not previously enrolled in the system may cause some delays particularly on arrival to New Zealand. However, the proposed systematic collection of information on all arrivals at international airports is likely to mitigate any delay.

Additional biometric information

Photographs are already collected from visa applicants and it is envisaged that this would be the standard form of biometric information required. The supplemental use of fingerprints and/or iris scans would be limited to cases where:

1. there is doubt raised by the photographic biometric information
2. there is an inability to use photographic biometric information (such as severe disfigurement)
3. there is cultural opposition to the use of photographic biometric information, or
4. an identity has been identified as being of particular concern or risk (such as a person who is to be deported from New Zealand).

The use of additional biometric information in relation to an individual would reduce the chances of a false positive being generated, making it far more likely that there will be certainty of identity in future interactions. Where any check on identity based on biometric information identified a potential discrepancy, this would be treated as any other potential discrepancy - as a cause to ask further questions and seek additional confirmation.

Collection at the border

Once the powers come into force through Order in Council, following Cabinet approval, the collection of biometric information from arriving passengers at the border would become a systematic element of the border process. Other agencies do not currently have powers to collect or use biometric information. The New Zealand Customs Service is similarly interested in establishing the identity of arrivals to New Zealand and is currently involved with the Department in trialling a voluntary system at Auckland airport. It is envisaged that the development of a biometric system to identify arrivals to New Zealand would take into account possible future interoperability between agencies. The Department would seek to avoid duplication of resources and expenditure.

Because the system would provide for checks against identities previously enrolled into the system to ensure there are no duplicates, it is important that the collection of identity information be mandatory and widespread. The more biometric identity information stored in the Department's database, against which a new enrolment can be checked, the higher the chance of detecting duplicate entries. However, this approach would require information to be held for a potentially substantial period of time. In essence, identity information would need to be held for as long as it is reasonable to believe that the identity could be used to gain entry into New Zealand.

In developing the mechanics of biometric information collection, the Department would seek to either adopt the draft Privacy guidelines for the use of biometric technologies developed by the DIA, or would work alongside the DIA and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to develop a new version specific to immigration whilst maintaining the principles of the draft guidelines.

New Zealand citizens

New Zealand passports are the preferred documents for persons seeking travel to New Zealand unlawfully for the purpose of making protection claims, or entering and working unlawfully within New Zealand. Collecting and using biometric information about people arriving in New Zealand on New Zealand passports would mitigate the abuse of New Zealand identity and travel documents. It would also ensure that the New Zealand passport was as secure as identity documentation from other countries in terms of who may gain entry to New Zealand.

The ability to compare the biometric information obtained from a person presenting at the border as a New Zealand citizen with the biometric template contained on the New Zealand biometric passport is one reason why biometric information is included in passports. The information collected on arrival would not be stored other than for evidential purposes if discrepancies arise and investigation reveals fraudulent use of an identity or document.

Access to the Department's biometric database

The Department anticipates that other government agencies may seek access to biometric information held on non-citizens. The sharing of information outside the Department would be limited to any authorised information matching programmes and information matching agreements specifically related to biometric information. This would move such formal authorised information matches into a new area (biometrics) so any future proposal to create such an arrangement would also need to consider the implications of such a change. Authorised information sharing agreements are currently subject to scrutiny by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. In addition, personal information may be disclosed to law enforcement agencies on a case-by-case basis under the Privacy Act, Principle 11, to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law.

Non-citizens whose biometric information is held in the Department's records must have the ability to access this information. Access to this information must be decipherable. However, typically a biometric template would consist of a series of numbers and letters that is meaningless outside of the biometric technology. In practice this could mean providing access to the physical photograph or original biometric image that generated the biometric template. Non-citizens would also have the ability to request that invalid or incorrect information be corrected, and have that request recorded in the file or alongside the record.