Section 5 - Decision-Making |
Decision-making is a core function provided for in the Immigration Act. Decisions broadly relate to:
A key principle identified in Section 3:Purpose and principles is effective immigration decision-making. This means having a legislative framework that provides for quality decisions that reflect New Zealand's range of immigration interests. To achieve effective decision-making, decisions need to:
This subsection considers who should make decisions on different types of individual immigration applications.
The Immigration Act gives many decision-making powers to the Minister of Immigration. Given that over 400,000 immigration application decisions are made each year, the Act enables the Minister to delegate most of these decision-making powers to immigration officers.
Government immigration policy contains the rules and criteria under which immigration decisions are made by delegated immigration officers. Delegations set the level of seniority required for certain decision types. Most immigration decisions are made, in the first instance, by immigration officers. Decline decisions may then be reviewed by independent appeal authorities or the courts, where this is provided for in the Immigration Act.
The Minister of Immigration has the ability (but is not compelled) to intervene in individual cases at any point. Ordinarily, the Minister limits intervention until the end of the normal decision-making process and to special cases that warrant ministerial intervention.
In order to ensure a fair system of immigration decision-making, the Immigration Act requires that the Minister of Immigration formally certify government immigration and residence policy. Government residence policy is a subset of government immigration policy and provides the basis for residence decisions.
Immigration officers have a certain amount of discretion in temporary entry decision-making. However, they have limited discretion in residence decision-making because of the requirement that these decisions comply with government residence policy approved by the Minister of Immigration. Only the Minister of Immigration can approve a residence application as an exception to residence policy (but cannot decline a residence application if residence policy requirements are met). Both the Minister of Immigration and delegated immigration officers have the discretionary power to grant a permit to a person who is in New Zealand unlawfully.
Decision-making powers relating to unique or special circumstances are often limited to the Minister of Immigration. Ministerial decisions most commonly relate to:
Immigration officers have delegated authority to make some of these decisions but are unable to grant residence as an exception to policy, revoke residence permits, or make deportation decisions.
Decision-making powers in regard to refugee status claims are conferred directly on refugee status officers. The Minister of Immigration has no powers to intervene in refugee decisions. Likewise, the Minister has no powers to intervene in appeals before the independent appeals bodies (the Residence Review Board, the Removal Review Authority, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority and the Deportation Review Tribunal).
These provisions provide important safeguards for independent decision-making and there are no proposals to alter them.
The Immigration Act provides the Minister of Immigration with the ability to be involved in virtually all immigration decisions if he or she wishes. This is consistent with the Minister's role, as part of the executive government, in determining the policy that informs immigration decision-making.
Ministerial discretion in decision-making is useful to address exceptional or unforeseen circumstances that warrant departure from established policy. The Minister of Immigration's discretionary power acts as a safety valve to prevent any unintended consequences of strictly applying rules and criteria. As the person ultimately responsible for government immigration policy, the Minister is well placed to judge when an exception to policy is warranted.
The Minister of Immigration has a good understanding of the “big picture” of immigration and what kinds of immigration decisions are in New Zealand's interests. As a person elected to the government, the Minister has broad social accountability for the way in which discretion is exercised.
The delegation of immigration decision-making powers enables the Department of Labour to take responsibility for day-to-day operations and the delivery of immigration services. Resources and processes can be applied across the business in a way that can achieve effective and timely decisions. Reporting and monitoring requirements help to maintain integrity in the immigration system and accountability to the public for immigration outcomes.
The delegation of decision-making powers with restrictions or conditions means that significant immigration decisions (such as health or character waivers) can be delegated according to an immigration officer's seniority. This ensures that decisions are made by the right people, with an appropriate level of seniority, and provides greater accountability to the public.
The ability of immigration officers to exercise discretion in considering temporary entry applications provides them with the flexibility to recognise a range of different circumstances having regard to government's expected high level outcomes.
Enabling both the Minister of Immigration and immigration officers the discretionary power to grant a permit to a person who is in New Zealand unlawfully enables people to regain lawful status where appropriate. No changes are proposed to this power. Subsection 10.2 discusses this issue in further detail.
While the Minister of Immigration does not have to intervene in individual cases under the current legislation, there is public pressure to do so. In practice, the Minister does respond to all requests for intervention. In 2004/05, over 4,000 personal representations were made to the Minister. This has steadily increased from around 2,000 personal representations in 1998/99. The increase is in line with increasing numbers of immigration applications to travel to, enter and stay in New Zealand each year.
The high number of personal representations creates pressure on the Minister of Immigration. It raises the issue of whether immigration decision-making is an appropriate use of ministerial resources. The question of resources is exacerbated by the fact that the Minister of Immigration must be involved in decisions relating to exceptions to residence policy, permit revocation and deportation. Requiring a ministerial decision on revocation and deportation may be unnecessary under the new expulsion model outlined in Section 6:Exclusion and expulsion and is discussed in that section.
In some instances, an immigration decision is sought directly from the Minister of Immigration without the applicant first making a formal application to the Department of Labour. This can unfairly disadvantage those who follow normal immigration processes (although many are referred back to the Department of Labour for the person to lodge an application).
The Minister of Immigration may also be asked to review declined applications, either after or instead of an applicant appealing to an independent appeal body. This is inconsistent with the rationale for the existence of the appeal bodies, which were established in 1991 to reduce the workload of the Minister.
There is a risk of creating de facto immigration policy if all personal representations are responded to by the Minister of Immigration and exceptions are routinely made. It reduces the incentive for applicants to follow established immigration processes.
There is no flexibility for immigration officers to make exceptions to residence policy. Officers must decline a residence application unless all policy criteria are strictly met, even if, on balance, it would be in New Zealand's interests for the applicant to be granted residence. While an appeal can be made to the Residence Review Board, or a case can be put forward for the Minister of Immigration to consider as an exception to policy, this is a time-consuming and cumbersome process. This appears incompatible with the objective of facilitating migrants in New Zealand's interests. It means, for example, that New Zealand may miss out on migrants who could contribute to economic growth and strong communities. Some potential migrants may choose not to apply to come to New Zealand due to not meeting residence policy.
Ms A has been working as a surgeon in New Zealand on temporary permits for two years and applies for residence.
As Ms A is 56 years old, the immigration officer cannot grant her residence. The officer would like to make an exception to policy as they know Ms A's skills are valuable and of benefit to New Zealand. Ms A is only one year older than the age limit for skilled migrant applicants.
Ms A has to request the Minister of Immigration to consider granting her residence as an exception to government residence policy.
Like New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) all have decision-making powers vested in the Minister, with provision for delegation of some of these powers to officials. Both Canada and the UK allow a person to approach the Minister at any point, including prior to lodging an application. While allowing flexibility, this has created problems for Canada with allegations of misuse of power. It also creates large flows of ministerial requests.
The Canadian Minister must report to Parliament each year on the number of permits he or she has issued. UK Ministers may exercise discretion where they see fit, provided they act reasonably and lawfully. Ministers primarily become involved in cases due to their high public profile or when there have been significant operational failures.
Australia, on the other hand, limits ministerial decision-making until the end of the decision-making process. This protects the Minister from political pressure to intervene while allowing ultimate government control. A parliamentary reporting mechanism has been established to make the use of ministerial discretion more transparent and to counter perceptions of paternalism and bias.
Australia does not allow for discretionary exceptions to policy to be made by officials in any decision-making. Officials may only apply judgement on whether policy criteria have been met. Canada allows flexibility for officials to screen some skilled migrants in, despite not meeting all the specified criteria, if they are likely to settle well economically. Immigration officers in the UK have the power to exercise discretion and grant an application, even if the applicant does not fully meet the requirements.
Two options are presented here. Both options retain a core decision-making role for the Minister of Immigration. Option A retains the current legislative provisions, with administrative improvements to the process for handling personal representations to the Minister. Option B proposes the delegation of further decision-making powers to delegated immigration officials. Option B also includes the administrative improvements discussed in Option A, and is preferred.
The Minister of Immigration would continue to be responsible for decision-making relating to exceptions to government residence policy. The Minister would be unable to delegate this power to immigration officers. The Minister of Immigration would retain authority to intervene in any individual case.
Administrative improvements would be made to streamline processes in order to limit the volume and nature of personal representations considered by the Minister of Immigration. These would not require legislative change, but would involve establishing clear principles about the type of cases that the Minister is prepared to consider and clearly communicating these to the public.
These principles could include a requirement that an applicant has exhausted all other avenues of decision-making and appeal before the Minister of Immigration will consider their individual case. A limit could be placed on the number of personal representations an applicant could make. If these principles were not followed, their case would be referred to the Department of Labour, or dismissed.
Continuing to restrict the ability to make exceptions to government residence policy would recognise the significance of these decisions and the need to ensure a high level of public accountability. It would not, however, address the risk of New Zealand missing out on migrants who are likely to benefit New Zealand.
Improving the administrative processes for handling personal representations to the Minister of Immigration would enable the Minister to focus on exceptional, rather than routine cases. It would narrow the range of requests made directly to the Minister, reduce ministerial workload and ensure that the Minister is always a last resort.
Seeking ministerial discretion as a last resort would mean that applicants may incur the expense of lodging a formal application. There may also be costs associated with appealing before seeking a decision from the Minister of Immigration. Most applicants who use the normal immigration process pay the related fees. Exempting people who make direct personal representation to the Minister reduces the fairness of the system for all users.
People who do not meet residence policy must still make a formal application to the Department of Labour. They may then appeal the decline decision to the Residence Review Board. The Board is not able to uphold the appeal, but may refer the application to the Minister of Immigration with a recommendation that it be approved as an exception to policy.
People are also free to approach the Minister of Immigration directly at any time, but the Minister may require that all other avenues be exhausted first. The proposed administrative improvements are likely to result in the Minister being an option of last resort.
The legislation would enable the Minister of Immigration's power to make positive exceptions to residence policy to be delegated to selected senior immigration officials. The Minister would, however, still retain power to make positive exceptions to residence policy.
Guidelines for when the Department of Labour could make exceptions to residence policy would be agreed with the Minister of Immigration. The guidelines could specify that delegated senior immigration officials could only make exceptions to policy where this would clearly benefit New Zealand. For example, there is likely to be a clear benefit to New Zealand to approve an applicant highly skilled in an area of absolute skills shortage but who does not meet the standard age criteria (see Example 1 above).
As is the case for the Minister of Immigration under the current legislation, delegated officials would only be able to make positive exceptions to policy - they would not be able to decline an application that meets government residence policy.
Further, as discussed in Option A, administrative improvements would be made to streamline processes in order to limit the volume and nature of personal representations considered by the Minister of Immigration.
Enabling the Department of Labour to make positive exceptions to policy would provide more flexibility in residence decision-making. This would meet the desired objective of facilitating the entry of migrants in New Zealand's interests, while following fair and efficient processes. It would also help to manage the high ministerial workload.
There are manageable risks associated with giving senior immigration officials such discretion. The risks include perceptions of reduced transparency, increased appeals or judicial review of decisions not to approve an exception to policy, and the potential for officials' decisions to be seen as setting precedents for future exceptions to policy. Officials would also come under pressure from applicants to use discretionary power in their favour.
Immigration officials do regularly exercise discretion in the context of temporary entry decision-making. In addition, these risks would be mitigated by limiting the decision-making authority to a small number of officials at a senior level. The officials would have a thorough understanding of government residence policy objectives.
Clear guidelines for exercising discretion would be agreed with the Minister of Immigration, and the Department of Labour would report regularly to the Minister on the sorts of decisions being made. Immigration officers would not be obliged to consider an application, but could do so where they felt the case warranted further consideration.
In the normal course of assessing a residence application, an immigration officer may consider that there are exceptional circumstances that indicate that granting residence to the person would benefit New Zealand. In such a case, the immigration officer could refer the application to a senior appropriately-delegated immigration official to consider making an exception to policy. This officer may decline the application on policy grounds or approve it as an exception to policy.
There would be no obligation for an immigration official to consider exceptions to policy, or to give reasons for not approving as an exception to policy.
Where an application was declined, the person would still be able to appeal the decision to the Residence Review Board. The Board (or equivalent independent authority) may determine whether the appeal was correct on the facts, but must refer cases to the Minister of Immigration where exceptions to policy may be warranted. The person could also approach the Minister directly, but should usually exhaust other avenues first.
A further option would be to enable the Minister of Immigration to distance him or herself from individual decision-making and to focus solely on policy and the strategic directions of the immigration portfolio. All individual decision-making powers would be conferred directly on officials.
This option is not considered appropriate because it would represent a significant shift from the status quo and remove a useful safety mechanism. None of the other countries compared to New Zealand in this discussion paper fully remove the Minister of Immigration from individual decision-making.
5.1 Key question
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This subsection considers two key mechanisms that help ensure fairness in immigration decision-making - giving potentially prejudicial information and reasons for decisions to applicants. (Another mechanism for helping to achieve fairness in decision-making is access to review or appeal, which is discussed in Section 7:Access to review and appeal.)
Potentially prejudicial information is information that a decision-maker thinks may lead to an application being declined. For example, information may indicate that a person intends to work in New Zealand when they are applying for a visitor visa.
The Immigration Act establishes an implicit framework for fairness in decision-making that allocates rights to individuals on a sliding scale based on an appropriate balance between the interests of New Zealand and the interests of individuals in the circumstances.
The Immigration Act provides that reasons must be given in writing for any decision to refuse to grant a permit, or a particular type of permit, to an applicant who is in New Zealand. Section 23 of the Official Information Act 1982 also provides that a person who is in New Zealand has a right to be given reasons for decisions made by a government department or Minister of Immigration.
The Immigration Act provides for exceptions to these rules in a number of cases. For example, reasons for decisions do not have to be given when:
The Immigration Act is silent about the provision of information on a decision to refuse to grant a visa to an applicant who is offshore. It therefore does not explicitly require reasons to be given for decisions when an applicant is offshore. Similarly, the Official Information Act does not apply to non-citizens or non-residents outside New Zealand.
In the interests of the administrative law principles of fairness and natural justice, however, it is an operational requirement for reasons for decline decisions (including offshore visa declines) to be routinely given. Information that is potentially prejudicial to the applicant is also provided to applicants before a decision is made, to allow them to respond. Exceptions are only made where there is an explicit exception provided for in the Immigration Act.
The Immigration Act has established a system that allows the information used in decision-making to be disclosed to and contested by applicants in most cases. It provides exceptions in cases where the decision is essentially about making a decision outside the normal requirements of the Immigration Act. For example, information does not have to be disclosed about a decision to decline a permit to a person who is in New Zealand unlawfully, or to decline to make an exception to residence policy. In these cases, the Immigration Act provides for limited rights to information, and reasons for decisions do not have to be given.
The Act is unclear on the requirements for offshore decisions. The current operational requirement of always giving potentially prejudicial information and reasons for decisions to offshore applicants means that offshore applications cannot be declined on the basis of classified information. This may prevent New Zealand from making appropriate decisions when open-source (non-classified) information is not available. The Immigration Act does not clearly specify a process that allows the Department of Labour simply to refuse to grant a visa on the basis of classified information.
This review presents an opportunity to reconsider which types of decisions warrant potentially prejudicial information and reasons to be given according to the interests involved.
As in New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the UK generally provide potentially prejudicial information and reasons for decisions to applicants. They also provide for exceptions to this practice in some cases.
Australia allows people to comment on the information that is being used to assess their visa application, with the exception of classified information. The immigration department informs people who have been refused a visa of the generic reasons their application has failed (for example, that the person did not meet character policy).
Canada's system is similar to New Zealand's. People are provided with the opportunity to comment on the information an immigration officer is using to make a decision on their application. If a person's application is unsuccessful they are also provided with the grounds on which the application was declined.
If a person is refused a visa to the UK, an entry clearance officer will provide them with the reason for the refusal.
There are a range of possible responses to this issue. All immigration applicants (both onshore and offshore) could be given potentially prejudicial information and reasons for decisions, or only those with particular interests at stake could be given this information. For the reasons identified above, the status quo in its current form creates difficulties. Two options are presented below. Both options could meet the objectives of the review. At this stage, there is no preferred approach.
Under this option, potentially prejudicial information and reasons for decisions would be given to onshore applicants only. The new legislation would retain the current exceptions, such as persons unlawfully in New Zealand. In addition, the legislation would create a new exception: an application may be declined on the basis of classified information without disclosing the classified information to the applicant.
Onshore applicants declined on the basis of classified information would have an avenue to have the decision reviewed. Section 9: The use of classified information discuses a new process with appropriate safeguards for using potentially prejudicial classified information in onshore decisions.
This option would recognise that people who are in New Zealand are likely to have greater connections to New Zealand and greater interests at stake. It would allow the new Immigration Act to have a clear, simple decision-making framework. It would allow the government to establish more effective and efficient decision-making processes.
There are likely to be a very small number of cases each year where classified information is relevant. This option would mean that offshore applicants have no rights to access potentially prejudicial information or reasons for decisions - including classified information. In onshore decisions, a proposed new process including appeal rights is discussed in Section 9: The use of classified information.
Allowing decision-makers to withhold potentially prejudicial information and reasons that were classified would strengthen the ability of New Zealand to choose who may enter and stay. This approach would align with the provisions in the Official Information Act that limit non-residents' and non-citizens' access to information when they are offshore. It would allow New Zealand to make appropriate decisions based on all available information.
Under this option, the new legislation would set out that potentially prejudicial information and reasons for decisions should be given to onshore and offshore applicants, unless there is an exception in the legislation. The new legislation would retain the current exceptions, such as persons unlawfully in New Zealand. As with Option A above, the legislation would create a new exception for applications involving classified information.
Offshore applicants - In the case of offshore applicants for temporary entry or residence, where a decision was declined on the basis of classified information, there would be no avenue of appeal on this matter. Where an applicant is offshore, they have less connection to New Zealand than an applicant who is living and working in New Zealand.
Onshore applicants - In the case of onshore applicants declined on the basis of classified information, there would be an avenue to have the decision reviewed. Section 9: The use of classified information discusses this new process.
This option would also allow the new Immigration Act to have a clear decision-making framework. It would establish legislation that provided for fair processes by requiring immigration officers to provide reasons for their decisions to applicants in most cases.
As with Option A, this option would allow decision-makers to withhold information that was classified, whether it was potentially prejudicial information or reasons for decisions. It would strengthen the ability of New Zealand to choose who may enter and stay. However, providing potentially prejudicial information and reasons for decisions to most offshore applicants incurs administrative costs.
5.2 Key questions
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This subsection considers future-proofing the legislation by enabling the use of additional tools such as electronic decision-making and decision-making by third parties. This empowering provision would be subject to future policy decisions made by the government.
Existing legislation generally requires the Minister of Immigration and delegated officers to make immigration decisions in person, although visas and permits may be issued electronically. There is provision for automated decision-making in making Invitations to Apply under the Skilled Migrant Category and screening travellers offshore through Advanced Passenger Processing. The Department of Labour also uses electronic processes to conduct an initial assessment of student permit applications lodged online. However, an immigration officer must still make the final decision to grant or decline a student permit.
Third parties in New Zealand such as employers or education providers often provide significant input into the decision-making process. For example, employers can advise whether particular skills are in short supply in New Zealand. They can advise on the likelihood of being able to fill a vacancy locally with respect to work permit policy. Education providers provide confirmation that international students have an offer of a place at their institution and have paid course fees. In many cases, they supply the Department of Labour with all the necessary information electronically. In both cases, the decision to grant a visa or permit must currently be made by an immigration officer.
Allowing only the Minister of Immigration and delegated immigration officers to make immigration decisions enables the government to keep a tight control on who is being granted visas and permits. It ensures that all relevant information, including character information, can be taken into account.
Having a small number of decision-makers also promotes consistency and transparency of decision-making. There may be more accountability and integrity in the decision-making process. Decisions made by people enable discretion to be applied, with exceptions to policy made where appropriate. It means that any risks can be actively managed.
The primary problem with the existing provisions for delegating decision-making is that they are not flexible enough to respond to future technology developments. The Department of Labour is increasingly moving towards electronic lodgement of applications, and there is scope to develop electronic decision-making processes in the future. This is likely to be used for cases that involve routine applications and low risk applicants.
The review also presents an opportunity to make legislative provision for other third parties, such as education providers and employers who could make good decisions, to decide immigration applications or to contribute to an immigration decision. They would obviously need to be held to account for decisions through strict monitoring and auditing processes.
Australia allows for automated decision-making where direct human intervention is not required. There is a caveat on this provision in that electronic decisions can only be approval decisions (with applications that are likely to be declined referred to an individual decision-maker). The Minister for Immigration has the right to override any decision made electronically.
The UK does not have automated decision-making. While Canada plans to use electronic decision-making in the future, it does not currently have such provision in place.
As with New Zealand, third parties may provide input into the decision-making process in Australia and Canada, but the authority to make a decision rests with departmental officials.
Three options are presented here. Option A would preserve the status quo and require the Minister of Immigration or immigration officers to make all immigration decisions. Option B would enable electronic decision-making in the future. Option C would enable third-party decision-making in the future and could be implemented alongside Option B. At this stage, Option B is desirable, but no clear view on Option C has yet been reached.
The legislation would continue to require that immigration decisions be made by the Minister of Immigration or delegated immigration officers. Electronic processes and the input of third parties could be used to support decision-making, but the final decision would have to be made by the Minister of Immigration or a delegated officer.
As discussed above, this option would ensure that all information is weighed up and any risks actively managed. It also promotes transparency, consistency and accountability to the public. However, continuing to require the Minister of Immigration and immigration officers to make all immigration decisions restricts the ability to streamline immigration processes in the future through the use of electronic technology. It therefore lacks the flexibility that enabling legislation should provide.
The Immigration Act would enable and support electronic decision-making. Electronic decision-making would involve applications, or aspects of them, being processed automatically on the basis of application information lodged online. A decision on the application would also be issued electronically. Its use would be restricted to low-risk application types (for example, student permit renewals) and, as with Australia, any decision to decline an application would be referred to an immigration officer.
This mechanism is unlikely to be implemented immediately. Rather, the Immigration Act would enable electronic decision-making proposals to be developed by the government in the future.
Electronic decision-making could extend the system currently being used to process student permit renewal applications lodged online. The system is programmed to make a series of decisions, in the same way as an immigration officer, based on the information provided. At present, the system sorts applications into three types: low-risk applications that can be approved, high-risk applications, and other applications that need to be assessed by an immigration officer. In all cases, an immigration officer makes the final decision to approve or decline a permit. With electronic decision-making, the system could automatically approve the applications that are assessed as low-risk.
The primary benefit of this option is that it would enable possible changes to the way in which immigration decisions are made in the future. In particular, it would provide flexibility for technological developments that could help to streamline immigration decision-making processes. Improvements to the timeliness of decision-making through electronic means would also enable decision-making to focus on more resource-intensive work (such as permanent residence decisions).
A disadvantage of electronic decision-making is that it does not leave room for discretion. Electronic decisions require a series of “yes” or “no” decisions. There is the potential for visas and permits to be granted in error under an electronic system.
These risks would be managed by limiting automated decisions to approvals in low-risk applications and requiring that a decision to decline an application be referred to an immigration officer (in line with the Australian approach). This would ensure appropriate fairness in immigration decision-making. There would also need to be provision to revoke visas granted in error. Careful consideration would be needed as to what type of applications could use this route. Cases where a substantial exercise of judgement is required would not be suitable.
The Immigration Act would enable decision-making by third parties. This would enable third parties such as education providers and employers to make immigration decisions, or aspects of them, in some situations. As with electronic decision-making, its use would be restricted to low-risk applications such as student permits and some work permit types (for example, Talent Visas).
As with electronic decision-making this mechanism would not be implemented immediately. Rather, the Immigration Act would enable third-party decision-making proposals to be developed by the government in the future.
There are no immediate proposals to implement third-party decision-making. A future possibility is decision-making on the Talent Visas. Employers could be accredited by the Department of Labour to make high-value work permit decisions.
Accreditation would only be granted to employers who meet certain standards and the Department of Labour would undertake monitoring and audit activity to ensure that good decision-making processes were being followed. Where standards were not being met, employers could lose their ability to make immigration decisions.
The primary benefit of this option is that it would enable the legislation to allow for future changes to how immigration decisions are made. There would be flow-on benefits to third parties if immigration decisions could be made more quickly. It could improve efficiency for the education industry and some New Zealand employers and businesses, giving them a competitive advantage over other countries. Improvements to the timeliness of decision-making would also enable the Department of Labour to focus on more resource-intensive work (such as permanent residence decisions).
The key disadvantage of third-party decision-making is the potential threat to the integrity of the immigration system. It may raise sovereignty issues if decision-making is delegated to non-government sources. For example, there may be risks around employers seeking to serve the interests of their companies at the expense of the wider New Zealand national interest.
There would need to be a robust process for determining which third parties could make immigration decisions and the type of decisions that they would be authorised to make. Clear parameters, reporting and monitoring requirements attached to any third-party decision-making arrangements would also be required. Auditing of decisions would help to ensure that integrity is maintained.
5.3 Key questions
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